Maximizing the benefits of confidential informants

Posted on March 20, 2013 by Lucinda Bell

As a consultant, managers often ask me how they can improve the level of return they get when using confidential informants. Managing a confidential informant incurs significant expense, in terms of the amount of officer time involved in managing them and the actual rewards paid to informants. Add to this the inherent risks that the agency carries when using confidential informants and potential cost increases. Given the expectation that law enforcement is continually being asked to do more with less resources, it is hardly surprising that Chiefs expect significant returns for their agency when allowing their staff to take on costly and potentially high risk activity such as managing confidential informants.

There are a number of things that an agency can do to increase the productivity and maximize the benefits of using confidential informants (and the officers managing them):

Every agency should have a comprehensive centralized list of all registered informants. Too many agencies still keep informants in ‘silos’ with confidential informants being viewed as the property of individual officers or specialized units.
There should be a single point of contact from which all confidential informants registered within the agency can be centrally tasked to meet intelligence requirements. The capability should exist to instantaneously identify which confidential informants have the potential to address the requirement and the agency should be able to deliver such tasking at the touch of a button.
Confidential informants who are not providing intelligence that meets the Chief’s policing priorities should be deregistered. Meeting informants who aren’t addressing intelligence priorities wastes valuable resources. If a requirement for their services arises in the future they can be reactivated. Informants should be viewed as an integral part of any ‘intelligence-led policing’ strategy.
Officers managing confidential informants need specific training on how to interview informants to obtain the maximum amount of information from them. Obtaining information from a confidential informant should not be viewed as ‘having a chat’ but as a structured debriefing process.
The agency must have software that takes the information obtained by the officer handling the confidential informant and conveys it to an intelligence unit where it can be properly assessed, stored and disseminated to those requiring it. Paper-based systems are time consuming and do not have evidential integrity of software-based systems as information is often lost or misplaced,
The agency should have performance metrics in place, both for officers and confidential informants, which enable managers to readily identify who is being productive and what is being produced.
An analyst should be tasked on a regular basis with identifying gaps in the coverage provided by existing confidential informants so that new informants can be proactively recruited to fill the intelligence need.
Larger agencies should consider setting up proactive recruitment units with highly-trained officers to proactively recruit and manage confidential informants in organized crime gangs and terrorist organizations.

Most of these changes can be undertaken by any agency willing to make a limited investment for a significant return. However, there is little point in taking all the risks in managing confidential informants only to waste most of the potential benefits that confidential informants can bring because of a limited paper-based management system.

John regularly advises ABM in relation to the development of abmpegasus software for managing confidential informants and has written several books on intelligence management and confidential informants. His book ‘The Human Source Management System’ provides detailed insight on the proactive recruitment and management of confidential informants. John he can be contacted by email john.buckley@abmsoftware.com

abmpegasus is a modular piece of expert-led software that helps law enforcement agencies and police manage information, intelligence and covert operations in accordance with best practice, policy and legislation.

If you would like more information on maximizing the benefits of confidential informants or the abmpegasus confidential informant management software please contact Dawn Starling on dawn.starling@abmsoftware.com or +1 703-326-1366. Alternatively, please complete an ABM Software contact form and a member of our team will get in touch.

The importance of auditing confidential informants and informant systems

Posted on March 8, 2013 by Lucinda Bell

In this blog confidential informant management expert and ABM Software Consultant, John Buckley, discusses the need for auditing confidential informant systems and informants.

Every six to twelve months most of us will take our car along to a garage and have it serviced to check it is running OK and to have the mechanic carry out routine maintenance. After all, failure to perform this relatively simple task has the potential to leave us with a car that is uneconomical to run or, even worse, a car that isn’t running at all. In the worst-case scenario this simple neglect can leave us driving a car that fails us at a critical time and which could potentially lead to a fatality.

The same standard applies to managing confidential informants; if there is not a regular, independent audit of each informant and of the informant management system then problems will occur. Unfortunately, sometimes the consequences will be significant and irreparable harm is caused.

6 key principles that need to be applied when auditing a law enforcement agency’s confidential informant system:

Start by reviewing everything. Chances are it has never been done and it is often easier and quicker to begin with a whole system review. Such a review should focus on policy, training and record keeping.
Review every informant that has been registered. The software used for confidential informant management should be able to give the reviewer various performance metrics at the touch of a button in much the same way as a mechanic uses computerized diagnostics on a car. If the informant is not addressing the priorities the chief has set then de-register them and tell them you have done so.
Review all the risks associated with the informant – they should all be documented together with the risk management measures in place. If there are too many risks associated with the informant that can’t be managed, de-register them and inform them that they no longer work for the agency.
Reviews should be carried out by someone independent of the management of each informant. Those directly involved in the case regardless of rank are too close to be objective. If you are reviewing your agency’s whole system bringing someone from outside the agency can be a worthy investment. A quid pro quo exchange with a neighboring agency can often be adopted, provided there is sufficient expertise.
Adopt a flexible approach to problems with officers; their faults may be a failure in the training they have received or in lack of clarity with the agency’s procedures. However, if there is deliberate wrongdoing, ensure you pursue it with the utmost vigour.
Set mandatory review dates for supervisors to review every informant and carry out random independent audits.

The cost of a confidential informant audit
Just as a visit to a mechanic involves expenditure so will any audit of an individual confidential informant or the informant management system as a whole. However, the cost of an audit is likely to be significantly less than any failure that will, without doubt, occur the longer that audit and maintenance are delayed. After all who would drive a car without getting it checked regularly by a mechanic and who would drive a car without regular maintenance?

John regularly advises ABM in relation to the development of abmpegasus – the world’s leading law enforcement software for managing intelligence, undercover operations and confidential informants – and has written several books on intelligence management and informants. His latest book, Managing Intelligence; a Guide for Law Enforcement Professionals, will be published in June.

If you require any further details on how to carry out an audit please don’t hesitate to contact our US sales office on +1 703-326-1366 or email John directly at john.buckley@abmsoftware.com Alternatively, please download our confidential informant audit questionnaire.

How to manage citizen informants

Posted on March 1, 2013 by Lucinda Bell

Lynchburg Police Department in Virginia recently publicized a scheme where they are using ‘concerned reliable citizens’ to provide the police department with information on drug activity.

In this blog ABM Software Consultant and confidential informant management expert, John Buckley, admits that while such schemes can have benefits they also carry risks that are not often apparent. John also offers expert advice on managing citizen informants.

Encouraging citizens to pass information on criminality to law enforcement is a necessary and commendable action for any police department to undertake. However, with any such scheme it is vital that the agency creates structures to adequately protect the citizens passing on the information and to ensure that they gain maximum benefit for the efforts they make and the risks they undertake.

What law enforcement agencies should consider when deciding whether to use citizen informants

One of the first aspects that needs considered is the ability of the law enforcement agency to protect those passing the information and from this standpoint a myriad of questions arise. Does the agency have specific procedures for managing such people? Have the officers involved received adequate training for their role? Does the agency have identified structures to record all details of the history of the agency’s relationship with these individuals and the contact the agency has had with them? What risk assessments are carried out with regard to the safety of these people and how are those risks subsequently managed?

Moving on from these initial considerations it is important to consider whether or not the citizen has been made aware of the risks they are taking and what instruction they have been given in regard to them avoiding self compromise? It is far from unusual for a person unfamiliar with criminality to compromise themselves through careless talk or action. A simple question such as “who have you told you are helping the police?” will often reveal the fact that they have told a significant number of people they believe can be trusted. Carelessness in such regard will often lead to the criminals finding out the person’s role and result in them being threatened or attacked. This then begs the question “then what?” Does the agency have a mechanism to protect the person? Does it operate a witness protection-style scheme or will the concerned citizen, in the event of a compromise, be left to fend for themselves?

A third concern with regard to such a program relates to how effectively the information from such citizens is managed and exploited. Does the agency have identified policing priorities and is the information collected to address these priorities or is the agency led, not by a structured intelligence-based approach, but by knee jerk responses to reports by citizens? It is easy to end up being led by the informant as opposed to by what the Chief has set out as the priorities for the agency.

It is a good thing for an agency to be proactive in maximizing the information they receive from citizens but a failure to do it effectively reduces the benefits and a failure to do it safely costs lives.

John regularly advises ABM in relation to the development of abmpegasus – the world’s leading software for managing confidential informants – and has written several books on intelligence management and confidential informants. His latest title, Managing Intelligence; a Guide for Law Enforcement Professionals, will be published in June.

If you would like further information on abmpegasus or advice on using citizen informants please email dawn.starling@abmsoftware.com or, alternatively, please contact our sales office on +1 703 326 366 to arrange a demonstration.

How to address the problem of confidential informant ‘agency shopping’

Posted on January 29, 2013 by Lucinda Bell

Addressing another of the concerns raised at the USA Trade & Investment breakfast seminars in Atlanta and Miami last week, confidential informant expert John Buckley advised attendees on how to tackle the problem of confidential informant ‘agency shopping’ across different agencies for the best deal.

Beginning by explaining the risks that were created, John highlighted concerns around officer safety, the distorted intelligence picture that ensues from this activity and the potential damage that could be done to the reputation of an agency and to subsequent prosecution cases. He continued that the extent and depth of the problem of informant agency shopping was often not fully understood. Many law enforcement agencies do not have structures within their own agency to stop an informant giving the same information to different members of that agency, let alone having measures in place to reduce the chances of an informant successfully agency shopping with different police forces in the same geographical area.

Although many involved in managing informants are aware that the problem of confidential informant ‘agency shopping’ exists, a lot of police officers are often not in a position to rectify it. To help address the growing concern, John provided several solutions on how the problem could be managed:

Firstly, each agency must have robust procedures in place to make sure that all confidential informants, managed by any member of that law enforcement agency are properly registered with the force, in a central register.
There must be agreements and structures between neighbouring law enforcement agencies that allow trusted parties to cross check all registered informants to identify where an informant is passing information to more than one agency. Such structures can often only be put in place with the agreement of the Chief or Sherriff but often fly below their radar until something goes wrong. Those with the knowledge need to make senior management aware of the risks involved and the mitigation needed.
Records must be kept relating to where a person has been identified as trying to provide the same information to more than one agency.
Standardised reward mechanisms should be created within a geographical area of operation ensuring that payments for information received become standardised thus removing one of the motivators for shopping around.
Having centralised intelligence management structures also helps to identify where very similar information is coming from a number of different officers, a potential indicator that a confidential informant is selling his wares to different buyers.
Accepting that there is often mistrust amongst agencies, all involved must seek to identify a ‘trusted’ agency that can hold a centralised register in a secure manner or one that can facilitate the de-confliction required. Advances in technology now make this much easier to achieve to everyone’s satisfaction as a computer can identify potential duplicate registrations without the need for human examination by third parties. Notifications can then be sent to both parties who have registered the informant.

John highlights that eliminating informant agency shopping and ensuring that all information is collected and processed in a professional manner is important if public confidence is to be maintained. In a later blog John will explain the real benefits of regionalised informant management structures and dispel many of the concerns that officers often have about such solutions.

If you would like advice or further information on tackling the problem of confidential informant ‘agency shopping’ please to contact John at john.buckley@abmsoftware.com or contact +1 703-326-1366

The importance of record keeping when managing confidential informants

Posted on January 22, 2013 by Lucinda Bell

The importance of record keeping when managing confidential informants (CIs) is paramount to any successful investigation. It not only provides evidence, if recorded to evidential standards, record also ensure you manage CIs both effectively and lawfully.

Using an effective confidential informant record system such as abmpegasus gives all officers involved in a case the latest status and activity of informants. If these records are kept to judicial standards not only will the informant be more likely to be effectively, and lawfully managed but you will be able to prove what occurred in meetings with the informant to the satisfaction of a court. Furthermore such records protect your agency from allegations of incompetence and/or deliberate wrongdoing.

In this blog ABM Software consultant and CI expert, John Buckley, reflects on the recent case of David M. Kammeyer in Chippwea where 22 year old Kammeyer saw appeal against his drug conviction upheld:

While each case will stand or fall on the information and particulars given it comes as no surprise that courts will exclude evidence if doubt is cast upon the circumstances under which it was obtained. All too often poor record keeping in relation to how an informant has been managed and how the information they have provided has been corroborated, leads to any subsequent evidence being thrown out in court.

A lot of the problems come down to poorly constructed systems for managing both informants and the information they produce.

John gives three pieces of expert advice on minimising the risks of informant related evidence being ruled inadmissible:

You must have comprehensive records of all dealings with the informant. This will include written reports for every contact including what was said and done, and by whom. These records go towards providing the basis of informant’s knowledge and the veracity of the information they have provided [See Gates v Illinois 462 U.S. 213 238 (1983)].
If you are going to use confidential informants in an evidential chain you must know the legislation and case law under which they will be scrutinised in court. Poor understanding of relevant case law often compounds problems of poor record keeping.
Use purpose built software for managing confidential informants. Paper records are inefficient compared to a computerised system and properly constructed software protects the integrity of the data within that system. Any software used must meet evidential standards with regard to auditing changes made to records that may be used in court.

John regularly advises ABM in relation to the development of abmpegasus software for managing confidential informants and has written several books on intelligence management and confidential informants. His latest title, Managing Intelligence; A Guide for Law Enforcement Professionals, is out this year.

If you would like more information on the abmpegasus confidential informant management software please contact Dawn Starling on or complete an ABM Software contact form and a member of our team will get in touch.

New Zealand Police Undercover Operations; under the Microscope.

Posted on November 29, 2012 by Lucinda Bell

In this blog ABM Consultant and undercover operations expert, George Harrison, discusses the recent scrutiny of New Zealand Police following their undercover investigation of the Red Devils motorcycle gang, drawing comparisons to the 1999 Regina v Campbell case in Canada.

The New Zealand Red Devils Undercover Operation
New Zealand Police believed the Red Devils aspired to become a chapter of the Hell’s Angels, a gang notorious for their involvement in large-scale hard drug dealing. An undercover officer was assigned to infiltrate the gang. However, to dispel the gang’s suspicions about the officer, police brought a criminal charge against him, involving the drafting of a false search warrant and the later deception of defence counsel and judges.

While acquitting police of bad faith and accepting that they had never intended to mislead, Justice Simon France nonetheless found the officers, including a very senior detective superintendent, had engaged in conduct that amounted to abuse of court processes.

In what appears to be a rather harsh observation, he also found that the police belief that they had sign-off from a District Court judge for their actions was reckless. Justice France found the judge (who is since deceased) was not adequately informed about the operation. However, because he appears to have raised no questions, he found the police belief that they had his approval was understandable. However, having found the misconduct, Justice France decided that, to protect the integrity of court processes, the entire prosecution had to be dismissed despite no one being seriously misled in or any defendant’s rights being infringed – a sharp rebuke to police.

The 1999 Canadian Case of Regina v Campbell
While Justice France’s decision may be unique in New Zealand; it is not unheard of in the world of law enforcement. In fact his decision appears, in many respects, to mirror the decision of The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the 1999 Canadian case of Regina v Campbell, a case where the court found Canadian police ‘violated’ the Narcotic Control Act by holding out a large quantity of hashish for sale to senior “executives” in a drug trafficking organization as part of a reverse sting operation.

The appellants, as purchasers, were charged with possession of cannabis resin with intent to sell. The trial judge found the appellants guilty as charged but, before sentencing, heard their defence. They argued that the reverse sting constituted illegal police conduct which not only shocked the conscience of the community but was so detrimental to the administration of justice that it warranted judicial intervention. However, unlike Justice France, the court implied that the police acted in accordance with legal advice having consulted with Crown prosecution services.

Considerations – The Constitutional Principle and Public Interest v the Purpose of Investigations
Although the Supreme Court considered:

The Constitutional Principle that everyone is subject to the ordinary law of the land, regardless of public prominence or governmental status.
The public interest that police officers carry out their duties in accordance with the law

they also recognized a justification for public officers to commit acts that would otherwise constitute offences to avoid jeopardizing prosecutions, providing officers acted reasonably and proportionally for the purpose of investigations. The SCC held that:

Police do not enjoy immunity as agents of the Crown when engaged in law enforcement.
Police do not enjoy immunity through a law enforcement justification at common law.
If immunity is needed, it is for Parliament to define the nature and scope of the immunity.

Regarding the issue of whether the proceedings against the appellants should remain because of abuse of process, the SCC stated:

“The conclusion that the police conduct in undertaking a reverse sting is, on the facts of this case, illegal does not of itself amount to an abuse of process or, to take it a step further, entitle the appellants to a stay”.

The SCC then ordered a new trial, adding:

“It will be up to the trial judge to determine whether or not a stay is warranted in light of all the circumstances, including the countervailing consideration that police conduct did not lead to any serious infringement of the accused’s rights, police were careful to keep control of the drugs and ensure that none went on the market, and the acknowledged difficulty of combating drug rings using traditional police methods.”

Conclusion – The Affect of Regina v Campbell on Canadian Law Enforcement
In light of the Regina v Campbell decision, the Canadian Parliament introduced legislation[i], commonly referred to as The Lawful Justification Scheme, which permits designated police officers, under certain conditions, to commit acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute an offence. In addition, parliament amended the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit police to undertake reverse sting operations such as that undertaken in the Campbell case. Since the legislative amendments in 2002, undercover operations in Canada have continued successfully without major issues.

The Lawful Justification Scheme would undoubtedly provide a workable framework for New Zealand law enforcement. Although the New Zealand case differs from the Regina v Campbell case with respect to the nature of the unlawful activities – The undercover operation undertaken by New Zealand police was reckless and ill-conceived. Drafting and executing a false search warrant and supporting documentation, and misleading the judiciary, will be considered an abuse of process and thereby bring the administration of justice in disrepute – any review undertaken by New Zealand Police authorities would be wise to consult other law enforcement agencies in Canada that have faced, and successfully overcome, similar issues in the past.

Police operations are under closer scrutiny and covert police operations, in particular, must have a higher degree of strategic planning, oversight and transparency. Senior police personnel must have more effective systems to evaluate, approve and manage all aspects of covert operations, including undercover operations, informant/agent recruitment and management, and both physical and technical surveillance. After all, “If you screw with the rules they multiply.” – Corwin’s Law.

George is an undercover operations and surveillance expert who regularly gives guest speeches on investigative techniques and undercover operations at a range of universities across Canada. George also advises ABM on the development of abmpegasus software for managing undercover operations.

If you would like more information on our undercover operations software, please fill in one of ABM contact forms and a member of our team will get in touch.

[i]Section 25,1 – 25.4 Criminal Code of Canada

How to avoid the pitfalls of confidential informant (CI) mismanagement.

Posted on November 15, 2012 by Lucinda Bell

Following the recent news coverage of a Sarasota County Sheriff confidential informant’s unlawful relationship with defendants, ABM Software Consultant and confidential informant management expert, John Buckley, discusses how to avoid the pitfalls of confidential informant (CI) mismanagement.

CI mismanagement is a common problem for law enforcement agencies across the world. To lose, or have to withdraw cases, because of allegations of mismanagement of a source or confidential informant is not only frustrating but also costly to law enforcement agencies’ budgets, time and reputations.

Allegations of confidential informant mismanagement can occur because of two reasons; either the agency mismanaged the informant or police records are so bad they can’t prove the informant was managed properly. Instances where CIs have been poorly managed by law enforcement agencies commonly occur because an agency does not have the necessary structures in place to manage confidential informants safely and effectively.

By following these three basic steps, law enforcement agencies can learn how to avoid allegations of CI mismanagement:

Create comprehensive procedures that detail how every informant will be authorised and managed.
Ensure every officer dealing with an informant, including those authorising the use of that informant, receive training specific for the role. Basic training is likely to take an absolute minimum of 40 hours.
Use an effective record system such as abmpegasus so that all officers involved in a case can see the latest status and activity of informants. If these records are kept to evidential standards not only will the informant be more likely to be effectively, and lawfully, managed but you will be able to prove what happened in court, protecting your agency from allegations of poor record keeping and, even worse, CI mismanagement.

Given the fact the Florida has some of the most comprehensive legislation in the USA surrounding the management of confidential informants, it is surprising that such incidents continue to occur in the state. Rachael’s Law specifically mentions the need for effective risk management and the training of officers involved. When cases like this occur it is a good time for all law enforcement agencies to take a look at their own structures, training and record keeping and to make a honest assessment of whether or not something similar could occur in their agency. Unfortunately bad publicity surrounding CI mismanagement doesn’t just affect the law enforcement agencies directly involved; it also tarnishes the public image of policing in general.

John regularly advises ABM in relation to the development of abmpegasus software for managing confidential informants and has written several books on intelligence management and confidential informants. His latest book, Managing Intelligence; A Guide for Law Enforcement Professionals, is due to be released next year.

abmpegasus is a modular piece of expert-led software that helps police manage information, intelligence and covert operations in accordance with best practice, policy and the law. By maximising accountability and productivity, it offers protection to the public and police agencies whilst ensuring operational integrity surrounding confidential informant management, surveillance, witness protection, suspicious activity reports (SARs), communications interception and undercover operations.

If you would like more information on the abmpegasus software please contact complete an ABM Software contact form and a member of our team will get in touch.

How to manage confidential informants (CIs) in terrorism investigations

Posted on November 8, 2012 by Lucinda Bell

Infiltrating a confidential informant into a group of suspected terrorists is a perfectly legitimate law enforcement technique. In reality it may be the only way to prevent a terrorist attack. However, if good practice is not followed, it can lead to concerns and, as seen with the FBI, allegations that the offenses would never have taken place if the “confidential informant” wasn’t hired.

Following recent criticism of the FBI’s use of confidential informants in terrorism investigations, confidential informant expert and ABM Software Consultant, John Buckley, discusses recent concerns and gives advice and tips on how to manage CIs in terrorism stings to avoid damaging the legitimacy of the investigation and running the risk of CIs being branded as agent provocateurs.

Criticism regarding the use of confidential informants in terrorism investigations
New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force investigators have increasingly used “confidential informants” to get close to and arrest potential terror suspects before they actually commit any crime. The latest example involved 21-year-old Bangladeshi student, Quazi Mohammed Nafis, who had no provable connections with al-Qaeda and no terrorism funding source, but was persuaded by an FBI-hired informant to carry out a bomb plot in New York.

Another case in recent years against four Newburgh men that reportedly attempted to blow up synagogues in the Bronx has also drawn criticism and created a general opinion that confidential informants have too much freedom in luring suspects into committing acts they would have never imagined otherwise. In that case, a confidential informant offered to provide the suspects with missiles to launch at the Jewish synagogue. After handing down minimum jail terms to three of the men, Manhattan Federal Court Judge, Colleen McMahon, slammed government investigators for their tactics.

Failing to address the concerns raised in these allegations not only damages public confidence in law enforcement but also leaves minority communities feeling ostracised from the criminal justice system which could affect the outcome at trial.

How to manage confidential informants in counter terrorism investigations
Sadly a report by the Department of Justice Office found FBI agents failed to follow their own guidelines in 87% of all investigations involving confidential informants, giving the public little confidence in such investigations. However, by following a few simple steps law enforcement agencies can ensure they manage CIs effectively and mitigate the risks of criticism:

No confidential informant should ever be used unless their “activity” behaviour has been authorised at an appropriate level within the law enforcement agency.
The authorising officer must be satisfied that the activities of the informant are necessary and the activity is proportionate to what it seeks to achieve.
The officer authorising the informant should be independent of the investigation.
The potential benefits of the operation should be documented as well as all the risks involved. Only then should the informant be deployed.
When deciding to use an informant to further an investigation, the authorising officer should take note of the ability and credibility of the informant and the strength of the existing intelligence available on the suspects.
Comprehensive records of every contact the agency has with the informant should be made.
The informant should be debriefed after every contact with those under investigation.
All records should be kept to evidential standards.
If the informant will be involved in a criminal conspiracy with those under investigation, or be involved in any other criminal offense, the level of authorisation should be raised to a senior rank within the agency.
Doubts about the mental health or vulnerability of any of the suspects should be documented as soon as they become apparent. This can help to mitigate an argument that the suspects were exploited.
Meetings between the informant and the suspects should be recorded and consideration should be given to recording the meetings between officers and the informant.
Independent verification of the activities of the suspects should always be a priority.
The early involvement of legal counsel should be considered as good practice.
There should be ongoing review of the progress of the operation by the officer who authorised the use of the informant.

Following these guidelines may not stop allegations of CIs acting as agent provocateurs but they will make them a lot easier to refute and help to improve public confidence.

John regularly advises ABM on the development of software for managing covert operations and intelligence and has written several books surrounding the topics of intelligence management and confidential informants. His latest book, Managing Intelligence; A Guide for Law Enforcement Professionals, is due to be released next year.

If you would like more information on ABM’s confidential informant management software (abmpegasus source management) and how it can help you manage confidential informants in counter terrorism investigations please email info@abmsoftware.com or visit our abmpegasus page on our website.

The benefits of women in undercover operations and how to ensure a successful sting

Posted on November 6, 2012 by Lucinda Bell

Following the recent praise of female undercover police officers in the Christie Pits investigation in Toronto, ABM Consultant and undercover operation expert, George Harrison, discusses the benefits of using women in undercover ops and what makes an undercover operation successful.

Toronto Police Chief, Bill Blair, recently went out of his way to praise the undercover female officers deployed around Christie Pits in Toronto, to catch a serial attacker who had been sexually assaulting women in the area: “[They] went out into that community and put themselves at risk, knowing if they weren’t successful in their mission, they could be the victim of an assault.”

Women play a vital role in all aspects of law enforcement and, more specifically, in covert operations i.e. undercover operations, informant development and surveillance. No longer are they limited to John sweeps (arresting men who use prostitutes) or acting as a bracelet (arm-piece) for a male undercover operator. They now engage in all aspects of undercover operations, adding a different dimension and more versatility to investigations.

So, what makes an undercover operation successful?

Careful screening of volunteer undercover candidates including a service record and psychological evaluation.
Training, training and more training
Mentoring, peer and organisational support
A professional, trained undercover handler (controller) and cover team
Careful operational planning
Management oversight and input
A full risk assessment that includes the operator’s experience, handler’s experience and cover team’s experience and the target’s background history
A thorough follow up including operational debrief and lessons learned
Case preparation and presentation in court

George is an undercover operations and surveillance expert who regularly advises ABM on the development of abmpegasus software for managing undercover operations. George frequently gives guest speeches on investigative techniques and undercover operations at a range of universities across his adopted home country, Canada.

If you would like more information on our undercover operations software, please fill in one of contact forms or email info@abmsoftware.com and a member of our team will get in touch.

FBI leak confidential informant details in motorcycle gang investigation

Posted on October 24, 2012 by John Buckley

It is unfortunate when any law enforcement operation is compromised. However, there is little that is more frustrating for those involved than when there are suspicions that the operation has been deliberately compromised by a corrupt officer.

Unfortunately this is commonplace and is the suspected case in a recent motorcycle gang investigation in Georgia where the name of a government informant was leaked which compromised – and abruptly halted – an undercover investigation of alleged criminal activity by members of the Outlaw Motorcycle Club.

While undoubtedly there will be an investigation as to what happened in Georgia there are generic lessons that can be learned that will benefit police using informants. So whether you’re a police agency in America, a police service in Australia or a police force in the UK, ABM Consultant and confidential informant management expert, John Buckley has three pieces of expert advice to help avoid the pitfalls of CI mismanagement.

How to manage confidential informants successfully

Keep the true identity of every confidential informant secure and ensure only those that need to know have access to that file.
Audit who has had access to the informant file and when that access occurred.
Document and manage all risks to the informant while they are engaged in activities for the benefit of law enforcement.

There was a time when the only options that law enforcement agencies had for storing an informant’s details were in an officer’s head or in a paper file. Thankfully those days are past and computers offer a much more secure and efficient way of managing a confidential informant file. And with a wide range of sophisticated police software out there, managing confidential informants has never been easier.

abmpegasus is a modular piece of software that helps police manage information, intelligence and covert operations in accordance with best practice, policy and the law. By maximising accountability and productivity, it offers protection to citizens and police agencies whilst ensuring operational integrity surrounding confidential informant management, surveillance, witness protection, suspicious activity reports (SARs), communications interception and undercover operations.

John has written several books surrounding the topics of intelligence management and confidential informants, and his latest book, Managing Intelligence; A Guide for Law Enforcement Professionals, is due to be released next year.

If you would like more information on abmpegasus software please contact ABM on info@abmsoftware.com or complete one of our ABM Software contact forms and a member of our team will get in touch.

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